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ABSTRACT
This paper examines relationships between institutional reform within
Australian federalism and Aboriginal health, both historically and in
prospect. It begins with a brief historical analysis of government
involvement in the general health arena within Australian federalism. It
then provides a more extended historical account of government
involvement in Aboriginal health and the emergence in the last 25 years of
a group of important non-government players, the Aboriginal community-
controlled health services. A more normative prescriptive analysis then
follows, which identifies lessons from past experiences and enunciates
principles for future action. These lessons and principles relate in particular
to ideas about complexity and the need for greater role clarification and
coordination in institutionalarrangements for Aboriginal health. We argue
for a view which in large part accepts this complexity and sees a need to
draw organisations and their efforts into the Aboriginal health arena, rather
than drive them out. We also, however, caution against drawing in all
relevant organisations in related fields such as housing, education and
infrastructure provision in the name of 'intersectoral collaboration'. A third
argument suggests, perhaps counter intuitively, that measuring the success
of institutional reform in Aboriginal health should to some extent be
disarticulated from changes in substantive Aboriginal health status. A brief
penultimate section of the paper looks at current general developments in
the health arena. The conclusion of the paper identifies the key challenge
and current opportunity for institutional reform within Australian
federalism relating to Aboriginal health. This relates to the linking of
responsibility sharing within Australian federalism and Aboriginal self-
determination.
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Institutional arrangements for the provision of health care in the Australian
federal system involve all levels of government and numerous non-
government actors. Arrangements for Aboriginal health care provision are
even more complex, involving not only general health organisations,
programs and services, but also Aboriginal-specific ones. Given this
complexity, it is perhaps not surprising that when public concern is
periodically aroused about the persistent poor status of Aboriginal people's
health, institutional arrangements do themselves often attract considerable
attention and criticism. Are these institutional arrangements delivering
health care to Aboriginal people in an appropriate and effective way, or
could they be significantly improved? Is effort being directed where it is
needed and suited, and is the complexity of arrangements within the
federal system itself a problem?
This paper attempts to explore these and other questions about the linkages
between Aboriginal health and institutionalarrangements within Australian
federalism. No attempt is made to engage in analysis outside the federal
framework, since this is seen as the inevitable reality of Australian health
care provision for the foreseeable future. Significant changes within the
federal health care system have, however, occurred in the past and are
continuing at present; and it is to the potential for reform within the federal
system and its linkages with Aboriginal health that attention is directed.
We begin with a brief description of the history of government
involvement in general health care provision within Australian federalism.
We then provide a more detailed account of the history of government
involvement in Aboriginal health and of the emergence in the last 25 years
of a group of important non-government players - the Aboriginal
community-controlled health services (ACCHSs). This history is followed
by a more normative prescriptive analysis which attempts to identify
lessons from past experience and principles for future action. The
penultimate section of the paper considers the relevance of some current
general developments in the health area. The conclusion then reiterates the
general nature of both the challenge and the current opportunity for
institutional reform in Aboriginal health within Australian federalism,
referring in particular to ideas of responsibility sharing and self-
determination.
Government involvement in health care: a brief history
At the time of federation in 1901, health care was an area of social
responsibility left, constitutionally, primarily with the States. The
Commonwealth was given a quarantine power, for which it legislated in
1908, and also, by force of circumstances, became involved fairly early on
in some public health matters, such as infectious diseases. To administer
this involvement a Commonwealth Department of Health (CDH) was
established in 1921. However, compared to the State departments of health
which ran some hospitals, funded and regulated others and directly
provided many other health services, the Commonwealth department was a
smaller policy-oriented organisation operating at a level of remove from
day-to-day health care servicing.1
During the 1940s, the Chifley Labor government attempted to involve the
Commonwealth far more directly in health care provision. It attempted to
establish a free national health service, staffed by salaried doctors, but was
prevented from doing so both because of opposition from the medical
profession and because of a lack of constitutional power. It did, however,
succeed in passing a constitutional alteration which gave the
Commonwealth a new head of power in the area of 'pharmaceutical,
sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental services (but not so as to
authorize any form of civil conscription)' (Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act, 51(xxiiiA)).2
Armed with this new constitutional power, and the ability under section 96
of the Constitution to make financial assistance to the States on 'such terms
and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit', both the Chifley Labor
government and subsequent Coalition governments began to develop a
greater role for the Commonwealth in the health care area. This role,
however, was primarily in health care funding rather than direct service
provision. Indeed, by the 1960, the Commonwealth had become as
significant a funder of health care services as the States, with each
contributing about one-quarter of Australia's total recurrent health care
expenditure (Butler 1991: 169). The Commonwealth's mechanisms for
contributing this funding were essentially twofold; first, payment or
reimbursement of fees for medical services or Pharmaceuticals delivered
by doctors or pharmacists to various categories of eligible individual, and
second, health-related specific purpose grants to the States.
This pattern of Commonwealth involvement in health care funding was
extended dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s through the introduction by
Commonwealth Labor governments of the Medibank, and later Medicare,
compulsory national health insurance schemes. As well as greatly
extending, indeed universalising, individual eligibility for Commonwealth
payment or reimbursement of fees for medical services and
Pharmaceuticals, these schemes also greatly increased Commonwealth
involvement in health-related State grants. This was particularly so in the
hospital funding area, where the Commonwealth agreed to make major
grants towards the running costs of State hospitals on the condition that the
States do away with public ward hospital charges and provide free public-
ward access to all.3
In recent years, as a result of these developments, the Commonwealth has
been contributing almost half of total recurrent health care expenditure in
Australia, while the contribution of the States (and Territories) has
remained around one-quarter. Within this Commonwealth funding
contribution, a little over half is in the form of payments for medical
services and Pharmaceuticals delivered to individuals on a fee for service
basis and little less than half is in the form of health-related specific
purpose State grants.4
By the 1990s, some aspects of these federal arrangements for health care
funding and provision were being extensively criticised. Both
Commonwealth and State participants seemed to agree that a weakness of
the hospital funding grants was that they were historically based and not
related to measures of hospital activity (see Bansemer 1991; Owens and
Duckett 1991). Incentives for 'cost shifting' between the pre-funded public
ward hospital sector and the fee-for-service health sector were also seen as
a problem, as too were incentives for cost shifting between various
narrowly-defined functional State grants programs (see Owens and Duckett
1991; Paterson 1995). Perhaps not surprisingly then, these health care
arrangements have in the mid 1990s been given some attention by the
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in its attempts to promote
both a more collaborative and cooperative style of Australian federalism
and microeconomic reform (Duckett, Hogan and Southgate 1995). Ideas
have emerged of hospital funding on the basis of 'case payments' for
various 'diagnosis related groups' and of health services based on 'people-
focussed ... streams of care', rather than multiple narrowly-focused
functional programs (Paterson 1995; Duckett Hogan and Southgate 1995).
These ideas are, however, still being developed and reform processes have
not yet progressed far.5 Established patterns of government involvement in
health care funding and provision within Australian federalism remain
largely intact; though there is clearly some impetus for further change now
emerging.
Government involvement in Aboriginal health and the emergence of
the ACCHS
In the Aboriginal health area, constitutional responsibility in the Australian
federal system was, once again, initially left primarily with the States.
From 1911, the Commonwealth developed a regional involvement in
Aboriginal health through its administration of the Northern Territory
(NT); but this was through its Territories rather than Health administrative
system. From the 1930s and 1940s, the Commonwealth came under
increasing pressure to expand its role in Aboriginal affairs. However, the
presence of a specific exclusion relating to 'the aboriginal race in any State'
in the Commonwealth's race power at section 51 (xxvi) of the Constitution
was often seen as an impediment to such greater involvement. In the
1950s, a movement grew up for the alteration of this constitutional
provision, led by the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines
and Torres Strait Islanders (FCAATSI). In May 1967 a referendum for this
alteration of the Constitution was successful and the Commonwealth's race
power came to include Aborigines.
The clear expectation at the time of the 1967 referendum was that the
Commonwealth would become far more actively involved in Aboriginal
affairs, including Aboriginal health, on a national scale. Bandler, a black
activist of the time, quotes The Australian newspaper of the time as
follows:
Strong pressure for Commonwealth help for Aborigines is certain to follow the
sweeping vote on the Aboriginal issue in Saturday's referendum ...
commentators said yesterday that the referendum vote gave the Government an
overwhelming mandate to play a much greater role in Aboriginal affairs in the
States. Some went so far as suggesting the creation of a new Department similar
to the Repatriation Department to help in Aboriginal housing, health, education,
employment and other problems associated with state government departments
(The Australian, 29 May 1967 cited in Bandler 1989: 114).
The Coalition Commonwealth governments of the late 1960s and early
1970s did not go quite as far as these commentators were suggesting. They
established a new Office of Aboriginal Affairs, rather than a department,
and through it began making specific purpose grants to the States for
'Aboriginal advancement'. Health was one of four major functional areas
identified for such grants and State government health departments began
in the early 1970s to establish Aboriginal health units, or special services
units, to receive and make use of these funds (see House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs (HRSCAA)
1979: 81-4; also Saggers and Gray 1991: 395-7).6
State grants for Aboriginal health were, in many ways, a fairly
conservative Commonwealth response, given the mood of the late 1960s
and early 1970s. A new politics was at that time emerging among
Aboriginal people, which was increasingly calling for specifically
Indigenous rights to land and group autonomy; in contrast to earlier calls
for equal rights in areas such as wages, drinking, social security and the
franchise. In this new politics, the States were seen as the established
conservative interests in Aboriginal affairs; so directing money to them by
way of specific purpose grants for Aboriginal health was not seen as
particularly progressive. The more progressive image of the time was the
province of a new breed of specifically Aboriginal community-controlled
organisations which were beginning to emerge in the health area and many
other policy and service areas as well; such as the Aboriginal Medical
Service established in Redfern, Sydney in 1971 and the Victorian
Aboriginal Health Service established around the same time. Although
these health services were at one level essentially small medical and dental
clinics, at another level they were an important institutional manifestation
of the politics of self-determination among Aborigines. They championed
Aboriginal control and participation in both health care policy and service
delivery and made strong claims for financial and other government
support.7
When the Whitlam Labor Commonwealth government was elected in
December 1972, its response to this new political mood among Aborigines
was somewhat more substantial. It adopted 'self-determination' as the key
term of Aboriginal affairs policy. It also established a fully-fledged
Commonwealth Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA), a royal
commission to examine possibilities for the granting of land rights to
Aboriginal people and an elected National Aboriginal Consultative
Committee. It continued to make specific purpose grants for Aboriginal
advancement to the States in areas such as health, but also began making
direct grants to the newly-emerging Aboriginal community organisations,
such as the ACCHSs. This support for ACCHSs allowed their numbers and
their share of expenditure from the Commonwealth's Aboriginal health
program to begin to grow (see Table 1).
The Whitlam government also instructed CDH to develop a National Plan
for Aboriginal health and to establish an Aboriginal Health Branch (AHB)
within its Public Health Division. The National Plan, which was approved
by the Commonwealth Minister for Health in March 1973, required the
CDH to launch an immediate campaign 'to raise the standard of health of
the Aborigines of Australia to the levels enjoyed by their fellow
Australians', with the government 'aiming to achieve its goal at the end of
ten years' (CDH 1973: 45). The CDH also, however, argued that 'practical
responsibility' for Aboriginal health was 'shared' and that its own efforts
could only 'attempt to knit together' those of others. Nevertheless, the AHB
would, the CDH claimed, both 'stimulate a uniform, national approach' and
encourage the 'active participation of Aborigines themselves' (CDH 1973:
5). It would also, the CDH claimed, 'provide a comprehensivenationally-
oriented advisory service' and develop a 'close working relationship1 with
the DAA to ensure that 'all efforts' were 'co-ordinated and achieve
maximum effectiveness' (CDH 1973: 46).
The Fraser Coalition Commonwealth government which came to power at
the end of 1975 maintained virtually all the institutional changes that the
Whitlam government had initiated in Aboriginal affairs. However, in the
Aboriginal health area it soon became evident that these were not having
the results hoped for. A report on Aboriginal health compiled by HRSCAA
in 1979 suggested that the 'standard of health of Aborigines' was still 'far
lower than that of the majority of Australians'and that 'little progress' had
been made in 'raising' it (HRSCAA 1979: iii and 28).
Table 1. Health expenditure of Commonwealth Aboriginal Affairs
portfolio, 1970-95.
Financial year
70/71
71/72
72/73
73/74
74/75
75/76
76/77
77/78
78/79
79/80
80/81
81/82
82/83
83/84
84/85
85/86
86/87
87/88b
88/89
89/90
90/91
91/92
92/93
93/94
94/95
Grants to Grants to Aboriginal
States community organisations3
$ million (A) $ million (B)
.64
1.27
2.85
8.34
10.56
14.05
11.78
12.36
12.60
13.15
13.89
14.18
15.47
15.78
16.09
15.06
13.43
12.94
11.85
10.93
6.50
5.95
3.36
0.99
1.11
.04
.10
1.07
1.35
1.87
2.58
3.96
4.90
5.39
5.97
7.44
8.38
12.72
20.40
22.76
24.70
24.13
26.89
27.65
35.68
37.15
44.51
53.74
68.06
B as Number of
% of ACCHSs
A+B funded
3
3
11
11
12
18
24
28
29
30
34
35
44
56
60
65
65
69
72
85
86
93
98
98
6
6
8
8
10
13
18
19
25
30
34
45
54
54
62
64
66
87
92
92
96
96
The category of expenditure reported here is officially called grants for 'Aboriginal advancement'. It
may include some elements of expenditure which do not flow entirely to Aboriginal community
organisations. It may, therefore, be a slight over-representation of amounts of money flowing to
Aboriginal community organisations, particularly in the early years.
A new category of 'substance abuse' appears to have been added to DAA financial records in this
year. The reduction in health expenditure from 86-87 to 87-88 may, therefore, have been more
apparent than real. If the 'substance abuse' category is included with health from 1987-88, the bottom
of the table reads as follows:
87/88
88/89
89/90
90/91
91/92
92/93
93/94
94/95
12.96
12.11
11.69
7.10
5.99
3.73
.99
1.26
28.12
31.33
31.98
41.53
42.17
57.40
69.61
83.50
68
72
73
85
88
94
99
99
68
72
73
85
88
94
99
99
Source: Financial appendices of DAA and Aboriginal and Torres Strail Islander Commission (ATSIC)
Annual Reports.
The HRSCAA argued that one reason for this lack of progress had been
insufficient attention paid to the 'physical environmental' conditions in
which Aboriginal people lived as a determinant of health status, but also
insufficient attention to 'social' and 'cultural' factors relating to Aboriginal
health (HRSCAA 1979: 37-74). It also made a strong call for 'increasing
Aboriginal decision-making and involvement in health care' and argued
that the evidence before it demonstrated that the 'focus of responsibility
and decision-making in Aboriginal health still lies outside most
communities' (HRSCAA 1979:111-114). Self-determination, it continued,
implies that:
Aboriginals should be given the opportunity to choose or design a health service
which best suits their particular needs and available resources (HRSCAA 1979:
114).
This support for self-determination in Aboriginal health did not, however,
translate into absolute Committee support for ACCHSs, as opposed to
services provided by State (or Territory) health departments, in all
situations. While the Committee was supportive of the ACCHSs and
wanted to see their number and support for them increased, what it saw as
'fundamental' was that:
Aboriginal communities have access to information concerning the full range of
health care options from which they might choose (HRSCAA 1979: 114).
Where the HRSCAA was more overtly critical of the States was in relation
to the funding of the Aboriginal health units within their health
departments. It argued that the States had not accepted any 'financial
responsibility for improving the health of Aboriginals as citizens of the
State' (HRSCAA 1979: 79-80). The States had, as the HRSCAA saw it,
simply availed themselves of Commonwealth funds on offer for Aboriginal
health.
Perhaps what the 1979 HRSCAA report did not fully reveal was the sense
of competition and even animosity which had by that time developed
between the newly emerging ACCHSs and the Aboriginal health services
of the State (and Territory) health departments. The ACCHSs saw the
States as having been neglectful of services to Aboriginal people in the
past and as having no right in the present to designated Commonwealth
Aboriginal health expenditure (see, for example, Nathan and Japanangka
1983). The State and Territory health departments, on the other hand,
sometimes saw the ACCHSs as amateurs or community activists who were
insufficiently qualified to participate on equal terms in the highly
professional area of health care policy and service delivery.
Some of this sense of competition and animosity was revealed in a
confidential report prepared by the Department of Prime Minister and
Cabinet (DPMC) in late 1979 and early 1980, the Program Effectiveness
Review: Aboriginal Health. Although never officially released, this report
did receive some circulation and was reported on in the press (The
Canberra Times, 25 February 1981). In it, the newly established national
body of ACCHSs, the National Aboriginal and Islander Health
Organisation (NAIHO), was quoted as arguing for a 'National Black Health
Plan' which would more than double the number of ACCHSs in order to
'replace States Grants programs' (DPMC 1980: 36). The States, on the
other hand, were seen as defending their efforts in Aboriginal health and
their rights to the States grants program (DPMC 1980: 11). However, the
DPMC report quoted a number of recent documents which seemed to
throw some doubt on the level of State commitment to self-determination
and community involvement in Aboriginal health. A 1977 Victorian
Health Commission report was quoted as stating that:
all planning and decision-making is the responsibility of the Health Department.
However, as Aboriginals become more highly trained and involved in health
matters it will become possible for the Aboriginal community to provide greater
advice and consultation (DPMC 1980: 82).
A 1979 letter from the Queensland Premier to the Prime Minister
commenting on the findings of the HRSCAA report on Aboriginal Health
was quoted as stating that:
the concept of a community basis for the design and delivery of health services
is viewed with considerable concern. It is not considered that this concept
makes provision for the professional expertise which is essential in decision-
making in such areas (DPMC 1980: 83).
This letter was also quoted as stating that the 'principles termed self-
management, self-sufficiency and Aboriginality are not so easily adjusted
to the process that ensures good health' and that:
It does not necessarily follow that programs popularly chosen by a community
are necessarily what is required or in the best interest of that community
(DPMC 1980: 83).
A 1979 letter from the Western Australian Premier to the Prime Minister
commenting on the findings of the HRSCAA report was also quoted as
stating that:
The State Government cannot agree with the funding of Aboriginal medical
services which are so costly, have no accountability, do not meet priority goals,
are unstable and disrupt the State's organised structure and planning for
Aboriginal health (DPMC 1980: 85-6).
Other States and the NT, most notably South Australia, were quoted in
ways which indicated greater support for community involvement and self-
determination in Aboriginal health. But the basis of a sense of competition
and animosity between the ACCHSs and the State and NT health
departments was clear.
Another dimension of competition and animosity which the 1979
HRSCAA report did not fully reveal was one within the Commonwealth's
administrative system between CDH and DAA. After establishing the
AHB in 1973, the CDH had clearly found it difficult to develop any really
significant role for itself in Aboriginal health. It felt that its professional
expertise and links with the State health departments were not being
adequately brought to bear and, more specifically, were not being utilised
by the DAA in its administration of the Commonwealth's Aboriginal-
specific health funding. The CDH came to believe that it should have
primary responsibility for these Aboriginal health funds, and so have
opportunities to tie in their allocation with broader health expertise and
resource allocation processes. The DPMC report was inclined to agree with
the CDH and recommended a phased transfer of the Commonwealth's
Aboriginal health funds over three years (DPMC 1980: 15-7, 64-5, 71-2).
The DPMC report also, however, sought to reaffirm the responsibility of
the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs for the 'development ... of national
policies directed to ... Aboriginal people, the administration of those
polices, and the coordination of programs' (DPMC 1980: 69). Clearly there
was a delicate balancing act being attempted here between increasing the
role of the CDH in Aboriginal health expenditure without too greatly
offending the DAA. The Fraser government declined to act on these
recommendations of the DPMC report and so this tension within the
Commonwealth's administrative apparatus between the CDH and the DAA
remained unresolved.
In 1983, when the Hawke Labor Commonwealth government came to
power these two dimensions of competition and animosity within the
institutional arrangements of Aboriginal health were, if anything, still
growing. The ACCHSs had increased their proportion of Commonwealth
Aboriginal Affairs portfolio health program expenditureto about one-third
and still wanted more (see Table 1). The CDH still felt that it should have
custody of the Commonwealth's Aboriginal health expenditure, but the
DAA believed equally firmly that it should retain the program. The CDH
had become minorly involved in additional funding for some of the
ACCHSs, for the 'salary costs of clinical staff at a cost of some $1.9m per
annum (CDH 1983: 31). If anything, however, this involvement had
exacerbated tensions. In 1983, the CDH reported that this 'dual funding'
arrangement was causing some 'difficulties' and a more 'logical approach',
involving 'one government authority' was being suggested (CDH 1983:
32). In an attempt to resolve this tension and much to the CDH's dismay, in
December 1984 the Hawke government decided to strip the CDH of its
emerging funding role in relation to ACCHSs and transfer the role, along
with four Aboriginal health staff positions, to the DAA (CDH 1985: 4, 47).
10
The CDH was, at the time, undergoing a major administrative
restructuring, reducing it from 13 to five divisions, and one office which
disappeared entirely was the AHB. The CDH saw itself as maintaining a
'professional advice' and 'policy' role in Aboriginal health, as well as some
involvement in national Aboriginal health statistics issues, but without a
discrete Aboriginal health office (CDH 1985: 47).
As a result of the December 1984 changes, the DAA came to have a fairly
clear lead role in Aboriginal health within the Commonwealth's
administrative system. To assist it develop this role, the DAA established a
Commonwealth interdepartmental working group on Aboriginal health in
1985/86. Then in December 1987 a combined meeting of Commonwealth,
State and NT Health and Aboriginal Affairs ministers decided to establish
a broader working group to develop a National Aboriginal Health Strategy
(NAHS) (DAA 1988: 46). Chaired by a representative of one of the
ACCHSs, and with State, Territory, Commonwealth and other ACCHSs
representation among its 19 members, over the next year this group
produced a major report (National Aboriginal Health Strategy Working
Party (NAHSWP) 1989).
The NAHSWP report emphasised a holistic concept of health among
Aboriginal people and the benefits of Aboriginal community-control and
participation in health care services. Because of this, it foresaw a major
ongoing role for the ACCHSs and looked forward to their further growth
and development (NAHSWP 1989: ix-xviii). The NAHSWP report was
also highly critical of the allocation of government 'responsibilities' in
Aboriginal health between different levels and departments of government
and called for greater efforts to both 'define' and 'coordinate' these
responsibilities and for greater 'intersectoral collaboration' (NAHSWP
1989: 35-40, 102-114). To advance these ideas, the report recommended
the establishment of a Council of Aboriginal Health which would be a
'standing committee' of both the Health and Aboriginal Affairs national
ministerial councils. The Council would involve Commonwealth,
State/Territory and ACCHSs representatives, would meet quarterly and
report to joint annual meetings of the ministerial councils (NAHSWP
1989:36-9). The report also recommended that similar 'tripartite forums' be
established at the level of individual States and Territories in order to
'resolve issues relating to intersectoral collaboration within the State and
Territory' (NAHSWP 1989: 40 ). It also recommended the establishment of
an enhanced Office of Aboriginal Health within the newly emerging
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), which looked
set to take over the role of the Commonwealth's DAA (NAHSWP 1989:
39).
In March 1989, the NAHSWP report was presented to a second joint
meeting of Commonwealth, State and Territory Ministers for Aboriginal
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Affairs and Health. Initial responses were consensual in their support.
However, as matters proceeded, consensus soon broke down.
To take the NAHSWP report further, a development group was established
which included only one ACCHSs representative alongside
Commonwealth, State and Territory government representatives. This
immediately put the ACCHSs offside and an attempt to draw them back in,
through a separate community advisory group, was only partly successful.
The two groups produced separate implementation reports with some
notable strategic differences (Aboriginal Health Development Group 1989;
Community Advisory Group 1990). Then only one of these reports, that of
the development group, was submitted to a third joint meeting of the
Commonwealth and State/Territory Aboriginal Affairs and Health
ministers in June 1990.
This June 1990 joint ministerial meeting endorsed the work of the
development group and, in turn, of the NAHSWP. The NAHS became
official government policy and moves were begun towards implementing
its major recommendations. The national Council of Aboriginal Health was
to be established and so too were its counterpart State and Territory level
tripartite forums. The Office of Aboriginal Health within ATSIC was to be
enhanced and an ATSIC Commissioner specifically designated as having
health responsibilities.
In December 1990 the Commonwealth Ministers for Health and Aboriginal
Affairs announced a budgetary commitment to the NAHS of $232 million
over five years. The Commonwealth's intention was also, however, to
secure broadly matching expenditure from the States and Territories
through formal Aboriginal health agreements. This was seen by the
Commonwealth as in line with the outcome of the Special Premiers
Conference of October 1990 and its commitment to a 'closer partnership'
between the Commonwealth and State/Territory levels of government
within Australian federalism.8
Eliciting formal agreements and matching expenditure from the States and
Territories proved a difficult process. During 1991, various elements of the
ATSIC structure became frustrated with the process, seeing it as
unnecessarily restricting their own utilisation of the Commonwealth's
designated NAHS funds. Nevertheless interim agreements were made for
1991-92 identifying $43.2m of 'new effort' by the States and Territories in
Aboriginal health (Gordon 1994: 28). In 1992, however, the ATSIC Board
of Commissioners determined that Commonwealth NAHS funds would
henceforth be allocated on the advice of ATSIC regional councils directly
to ACCHSs and that this would occur independently of the further pursuit
of agreements with the States and Territories relating to Aboriginal health.
The negotiation of such agreements was to be referred to the Council of
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Aboriginal Health. The Council was also to address the issue of Aboriginal
health 'goals and targets' which were supposed in some way to underlie
these agreements and on which some preliminary work had recently been
done (Wronski and Smallwood nd). However the Council had only just
been convened and how it would operate was still rather uncertain.
By 1992-93, many ACCHSs were beginning to express considerable
dissatisfaction with the implementation of the NAHS. One reason for this
was the rather tardy establishment of the Council of Aboriginal Health and
its counterpart State/Territory tripartite forums. Another reason for
dissatisfaction was that the vast majority of the Commonwealth's promised
NAHS funds - some $171 million of the projected $232 million over the
five year period - was not to flow to the ACCHSs, but to Aboriginal
community organisations involved in housing provision and infrastructure
(Gordon 1994: 18). This in part derived from the emphasis on holism,
intersectoral collaboration and the importance of 'health systems
infrastructure', as well as health services, to Aboriginal health in the
NAHSWP report (NAHSWP 1989: 59-101). However, despite their
support for these ideas, the ACCHSs were less than happy about having
such a large portion of the NAHS budget directed outside the health
services sector.
A further and related reason for dissatisfaction on the part of the ACCHSs
was their perception that in gaining access to funding primarily through
ATSIC and its newly-emerging regional council structure, they were
increasingly being drawn into invidious competition for resources with
other Aboriginal community-controlled organisations. The ACCHSs did
not generally perceive that they were faring well in this process and began
to resent it. They began to think seriously about the possibility of having
their funding program removed from ATSIC and transferred to the
Commonwealth's health portfolio, which was by late 1993 part of the new
Commonwealth Department of Human Services and Health (CDHSH) with
an annual budget of around $17 billion; some 20 times the size of ATSIC's
(CDHSH 1994: 3). Indeed in September 1993, meeting as the National
Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisation (NACCHO), the
ACCHSs passed a resolution explicitly stating that they wanted such a
transfer to occur. The ACCHSs had now become major critics of ATSIC,
its Office of Aboriginal Health and its implementation of the NAHS.
1994 was a significant year for institutional arrangements in Aboriginal
health. It began with one of those outbreaks of public attention and concern
about Aboriginal health which periodically arise in Australian public life
and ended with the publication of a damning official evaluation of the
NAHS. In between, public debate was focused on Aboriginal health in a
manner and to an extent seldom previously seen.
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The outbreak of public attention and concern began in January 1994 when
the then Commonwealth Minister for Human Services and Health, Graham
Richardson, visited a number of Aboriginal communities in northern
Australia and suggested that living conditions in some of these
communities were 'appalling1 and would 'barely be tolerated in a war-
ravaged African nation'. He argued that existing funding of matters relating
to Aboriginal health from a variety of Commonwealth, State and Territory
sources was 'uncoordinated' and an 'extraordinarily wasteful and stupid
way to do business'. Richardson claimed he was going to 'do something' to
'clear up the mess' (The Canberra Times: 21 January 1994).9
Two months later Richardson retired from federal politics, but before he
did he established a new Office of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Health
Services (OATSIHS) within CDHSH. He also made a bid for the new
Office to take over ATSIC's Aboriginal health program, promising
increased funding as well. ATSIC, however, resisted the move and
CDHSH and the new Commonwealth Minister for Human Services and
Health, Carmen Lawrence, failed to convince the Expenditure Review
Committee of Cabinet of the merits of the change during the 1994 budget
process. However an extra $25 million over five years was identified for
Aboriginal health in the 1994 Commonwealth budget and was to be
allocated by a joint health planning committee of both CDHSH and
ATSIC. CDHSH now had some program involvement in Aboriginal health
funding and continued to make appointments to its new OATSIHS. It also
continued to come under pressure from the ACCHSs and NACCHO to
persist with its bid to take over Aboriginal health funding from ATSIC
(see, for example, Anderson 1994; Bartlett and Legge 1994).
During the latter half of 1994 an official committee, comprising two
NACCHO members, four elected ATSIC representatives. Commonwealth
and NT government officials and a health academic, undertook an
evaluation of the NAHS. Their major finding was that the NAHS 'was
never effectively implemented' (Gordon 1994: 3).
One element of this lack of implementation was that the Council of
Aboriginal Health, the key national tripartite forum, had 'lacked political
support from Commonwealth and State/Territory Ministers and ATSIC'
(Gordon 1994: 3). The Council had not been convened until 1992 and had
met only four times by October 1993.'° At its fourth meeting, partly
reflecting ACCHSs and NACCHO representation within it, the Council
had passed a resolution that Aboriginal health funding be transferred from
ATSIC to the CDHSH (Gordon 1994: 31). From then on the Office of
Aboriginal Health within ATSIC failed to convene any further meetings of
the Council. The Council, and particularly its ACCHSs and NACCHO
representatives, had lost faith in ATSIC and now ATSIC and its Office of
Aboriginal Health were losing interest in the Council.
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It was not just ATSIC, however, which had lost interest and failed to
support the Council of Aboriginal Health. The joint forum of
Commonwealth and State/Territory Aboriginal Affairs and Health
ministers, of which the Council was supposed to be a standing committee,
had not met at all since the June 1990 meeting at which it had endorsed the
work of the development group and the NAHS. Commonwealth, State and
Territory ministers also seemed to have lost interest in Aboriginal health
and the Council was left without the ongoing linkages to them that it
needed.
Another finding of the NAHS evaluation was that after the 1992 ATSIC
Board decision to allocate Commonwealth NAHS funds without pursuing
formal agreements with the States and Territories seeking matching
expenditure, 'no subsequent agreements were negotiated' (Gordon 1994:
28). This was despite the fact that one of the early outcomes of the COAG
processes had been the signing by all levels of Australian government in
December 1992 of a general National Commitment to Improved Outcomes
in the Delivery of Programs and Services for Aboriginal Peoples and
Torres Strait Islanders which also foreshadowed the making of more
specific bilateral agreements in areas such as health (COAG 1992: 10-11)
The NAHS evaluation committee also found that work on Aboriginal
health 'goals and targets' had not been significantly progressed either
(Gordon 1994: 29). Neither finding was perhaps surprising, given the state
of the Council of Aboriginal Health, to which the tasks had been referred.
With such a damning evaluation of the NAHS being produced in late 1994,
it was perhaps inevitable that in 1995 there would be significant changes to
institutional arrangements relating to Aboriginal health." The impetus for
change was, in may ways, the ACCHSs growing dissatisfaction with
ATSIC and its role in the inadequate implementation of the NAHS. The
ACCHSs were becoming more and more committed to the idea that the
Commonwealth Aboriginal health program, through which they were
primarily funded, should be transferred to the CDHSH. ACCHSs pressure
for this change was unremitting and, in the context of the 1995/96
Commonwealth budget, was finally successful. The ATSIC health program
and its substance abuse program, with a combined 1994/95 expenditure of
$84.76m (see Table 1), were transferred to the OATSIHS within the
CDHSH from July 1995. ATSIC resisted this administrative transfer to the
end. However the dissatisfaction and persistence of the ACCHSs was such
that it was, in some ways, inevitable. The ACCHSs wanted their funding
outside ATSIC and were not going to give up t i l l that was the case.
As part of the inter-organisational politics of effecting this transfer, in the
latter half of 1995 ATSIC did, however, successfully negotiate a
Memorandum of Understanding with the Commonwealth Minister and
Department of Human Services and Health regarding its ongoing
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involvement in health matters. This established that 'principles' of 'holistic
... health', 'community control and participation' and 'intersectoral
collaboration', drawn from the NAHS, would 'guide the development and
implementation' of Aboriginal health programs (ATSIC Chairperson and
Commonwealth Minister of State for Human Services and Health
(CMSHSH) 1995:1). It also set out a 'framework for cooperation' between
ATSIC and CDHSH which provided for ATSIC to have ongoing
involvement in Aboriginal health planning at regional, State/Territory and
national levels and through both its elected and administrative arms
(ATSIC Chairperson and CMSHSH 1995: 2). ATSIC's continuing role in
'environmental health matters' was also re-affirmed, as too were its
'statutory responsibilities' to 'monitor' and 'advise ... on the coordination' of
all Commonwealth programs for Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islander
peoples (ATSIC Chairperson and CMSHSH 1995: 3-4). ATSIC's ongoing
role in Aboriginal health matters was being clearly acknowledged, even
though it had lost the Commonwealth Aboriginal-specific program
expenditure. In many ways this was a highly desirable outcome for ATSIC,
since it was assured of ongoing involvement, without itself having to bear
the sole responsibility for program ownership and health status outcomes.
The OATSIHS, meanwhile, was setting about getting to know its newly
acquired constituency of ACCHSs. Its approach was fairly gentle and
gradualist. A 'rebasing' exercise was begun, which was an attempt by the
CDHSH to get to know how the ACCHSs ran and were funded; not just
from the former ATSIC sources but from other sources as well. Some
minor funding increases were offered relating to matters such as training
and professional development of ACCHSs staff, while more general
planning exercises also gradually got underway. It was, however, pretty
much 'business as usual' for the ACCHSs.
The institutional reformist energies of the OATSIHS, during late 1995 and
early 1996, appeared to be more directed to relations with the States and
Territories, than to relations with the ACCHSs. OATSIHS re-invigorated
the idea of formal bilateral Aboriginal health agreements with each State
and Territory in line with the 1992 multilateral COAG National
Commitment and began pursuing such agreements quite vigorously
(COAG 1992). The agreements being pursued were, however, more
'framework' statements than detailed plans. They attempted to establish
ongoing 'joint planning processes' which would involve local NACCHO
and ATSIC representatives as well as Commonwealth and State/Territory
health departments (see South Australian Minister for Health et al. 1996:
3.4-3.7). Unlike the agreements sought in 1991, these new agreements
did not ask the States and Territories to match Commonwealth funding;
although they did ask them to 'identify and publicly report' their own
'current levels of funding' for Aboriginal health both in 'mainstream' and
'specific' services and also to commit themselves to an 'increase' in those
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'current levels of resources' (see South Australian Minister for Health et al.
1996: 3.1). In the process of negotiation, these agreements also moved
from being bilateral, to trilateral or even quadrilateral agreements; since as
well as the Commonwealth and State/Territory ministers for health
becoming signatories, both the ATSIC chairperson and in some cases a
State or Territory-based ACCHSs representative also looked to becoming
signatories. As such, the agreements appear to be establishing tripartite, or
even quadripartite forums and processes in each State and Territory
repeating hopefully in more successful form one of the ideas of the
NAHS. As of August 1996, three of these agreements had been signed
and the other five looked set to be signed in the near future.
One final institutional development under the new OATSIHS regime has
been the establishment of a new national Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Health Council. Membership includes eight NACCHO
representatives, three ATSIC Commissioners, a representative of the
Torres Strait Regional Authority, an Australian Medical Association
representative and a National Health and Medical Research Council
representative. It met for the first time in June 1996.M
In the wake of the election of the Howard Coalition Commonwealth
government in March 1996, and the renaming of the CDHSH as the
Commonwealth Department of Health and Family Services (CDHFS), a
number of more general developments in the health area of potential
relevance to institutional arrangements for Aboriginal health are also
beginning to take shape. More, perhaps, needs to be said about these.
However, at this point, it may be useful to reflect more critically on this
history of government involvement in Aboriginal health and the emergence
of the ACCHSs in order to suggest what lessons might be drawn from past
experience and principles enunciated for future action.
Lessons and principles
One of the more striking aspects of this history of government involvement
in Aboriginal health and the emergence of the ACCHSs is the constant
criticism directed at the complexity of institutional arrangements and the
need for greater coordination and role clarification. While there is no
denying institutional complexity and the legitimacy of these concerns, the
call to reduce complexity and for greater coordinationand role clarification
can be deceptively simple and consensual. It can obscure the extent to
which there are in fact substantial areas of disagreement among the various
actors involved in Aboriginal health over who should be doing what, where
and how. In such circumstances, talk about clarifying and coordinating
roles can become a respectable code for fairly blunt exercises in inter-
organisational politics. It can at times be little more than an attempt to
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prevail in disagreements and to drive out of the Aboriginal health arena
organisations which harbour opposing views and interests.
In 1983-84, for example, it seemed reasonable and unexceptional to
complain of 'dual funding' arrangements in Aboriginal health at the
Commonwealth level and to call for a 'more logical approach' involving
'one government authority' (CDH 1983: 32). The ultimate consequence of
this call for coordination and role clarification was, however, effectively to
drive out, or at least greatly marginalise, the CDH from the Aboriginal
health arena for some years to come. The DAA's and later ATSIC's role as
the lead Commonwealth agency in Aboriginal health in the late 1980s and
early 1990s was certainly clear and there was no problem of coordination.
But the overall Commonwealth effort in Aboriginal health was perhaps not
as effective as it might have been had the CDH been more involved.
In 1995, by contrast, when Commonwealth funding for Aboriginal-specific
health programs moved from ATSIC to CDHSH, the language of role
clarification and coordination does not appear to have been used to drive
out ATSIC from the Aboriginal health arena. Indeed the experience
between the CDHSH and ATSIC in negotiating their Memorandum of
Understanding in the latter half of 1995 would appear to be a fairly
genuine attempt to clarify organisational roles, while acknowledging more
generally that both organisations have important and different
contributions to make in Aboriginal health. Thus, talk about coordinating
and clarifying roles can be useful, but it can also obscure what are in fact
fairly blunt exercises in inter-organisational politics.
Underlying talk about coordination and role clarification, there is a
somewhat larger issue concerning institutional complexity and
organisational involvement in Aboriginal health. The common view is that
institutional arrangements relating to Aboriginal health are unnecessarily
complex and that there is a need for some significant clearing of the
organisational landscape. A contrary view, however, is that to a large
extent the complexity of institutional arrangements in Aboriginal health
reflects the complexity of the issue being addressed. Aboriginal people's
health is affected by numerous inter-related factors which relate to the
roles and responsibilities of numerous government, and also non-
government, organisations. For a concerted and effective effort in
Aboriginal health to emerge, large numbers of these organisations need to
be drawn in to the Aboriginal health arena and linked in appropriate ways
one to another. On this view, the need is not for a clearing of the
organisational landscape but for its enhancement; a further bringing in of
organisational players with useful resources and expertise, an increase in
resources and the creation of better linkages. This contrary view, we would
argue, deserves greater consideration.
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The need to draw in and enhance organisational efforts, rather than drive
organisations out, relates also to the other ongoing dimension of
organisational tension in Aboriginal health over recent years; that between
the ACCHSs and the Aboriginal health units of the State and Territory
Health Departments. The ACCHSs are now well established and have
articulated a strong philosophy of self-determination in Aboriginal health
to support their claims for involvement. The ACCHSs need,
unquestionably, to be further supported and in pursuing this objective it is
necessary to facilitate the development of more effective linkages between
these organisations and the broader health arena. Their participation in the
NAHSWP was a useful step in this direction, as too was the idea, if not so
much the actuality, of subsequent tripartite Aboriginal health forums.
ACCHSs involvement in the current round of State/Territory-based
Aboriginal health agreement making and the foreshadowed joint planning
processes and structures is also encouraging. It suggests that the central
role of the ACCHSs' in Aboriginal health is gradually being recognised. It
is clearly now unacceptable for either State or Territory health
departments, or any one else in the Aboriginal health arena, to treat the
ACCHSs as anything less than full partners and crucial participants.
Certainly comments like those quoted earlier from the Victorian Health
Commission and the Western Australia and Queensland Premiers in the
late 1970s, which expressed reservations about Aboriginal involvement in
health planning processes, were unhelpful in their day and need not to be
repeated. Fortunately there is some evidence to suggest that the State and
Territory health departments have moved in this direction over recent
years, though they could still move further.
The State and Territory health departments need also to more effectively
discharge their responsibilities within the Aboriginal health arena. This
may require some accommodation and encouragement. However, these
organisations still directly contribute one-quarter of all health expenditure
in Australia and are responsible for the actual expenditure of a good bit
more as well. They provide and regulate both major hospital and other
health service facilities. They simply cannot be done without. The
challenge is not to drive these organisations out of Aboriginal health, but to
make them ever more responsive to Aboriginal health needs and ideas of
Aboriginal self-determination in all health service activities. What, for
example, does and can Aboriginal self-determination mean in the acute
care public hospital setting, which the States and Territories so clearly
dominate? How, further, can this be linked with ideas about Aboriginal
self-determination in the primary care area, where the ACCHSs are more
active but the State and Territory health departments still also play some
role?
There is still clearly considerable potential for tension and disagreement
between the State and Territory health departments and the ACCHSs over
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various aspects of their approaches to Aboriginal health care. One of the
crucial roles that the CDHFS and its OATSIHS may be able to play in the
future is, potentially, to mediate and lessen such tensions. The
Commonwealth's advantage here is that it's health administration operates
largely at one remove from day to day health servicing and that it has a
major interest in both the ACCHSs and State/Territory health systems. It
funds and supports both to a very significant degree and has a substantial
interest in both effectively engaging with Aboriginal health issues.
OATSIHS should, however, seek to avoid a situation, such as occurred in
the 1970s and 1980s, where the ACCHSs and the State/Territory health
departments appeared to be competing for Commonwealth Aboriginal
health dollars (see Table 1). This fuelled the tensions between the ACCHSs
and the State/Territory departments and it is perhaps no coincidence that
these tensions have only begun to lessen in recent years as the ACCHSs
have come to receive virtually all Commonwealth Aboriginal-specific
health funding, while the State and Territory Aboriginal health units have
been forced to draw their funds from elsewhere (see Table 1). OATSIHS
has become involved in some small scale funding of State/Territory health
departments to elicit particular developments in the ongoing processes of
making Aboriginal health agreements with the States and Territories.
However, OATSIHS should guard against such funding becoming
entrenched or large scale, so as to avoid the perception of competition for
funds between the ACCHSs and the States/Territories. Fortunately, this
appears to be the direction in which the OATSIHS is moving.
OATSIHS's role in relation to the ACCHSs is clearly very important. The
basis of this relationship is, of course, funding, which will need to be
continued and in time increased. However, the relationship could
potentially offer far more than funding. It could provide the ACCHSs with
an entry point to the resources and expertise of the larger Commonwealth
health system. This is something which the former Office of Aboriginal
Health within ATSIC could not provide the ACCHSs, because of its lack
of sufficient health administrationexpertise and linkages. This lack may in
fact have been behind some of the souring of relations between the ATSIC
Office and the ACCHSs. The ACCHSs often felt the ATSIC Office had no
health expertise and was as a consequence making inappropriate demands
of them; such as the collection of inappropriate health performance
indicators (see Anderson and Brady 1995). It is to be hoped that
OATSIHS's relationship with the ACCHSs does not suffer similar
problems and that OATSIHS uses its position within the Commonwealth's
health administration to the advantage of the ACCHSs. The 'rebasing'
exercise in which OATSIHS has engaged the ACCHSs in the last year has
already shown that as a group they obtain about 40 per cent of their
financial resources from sources other than the Commonwealth
Aboriginal-specific health program. With the encouragement and
mentoring of knowledgeable health bureaucrats within OATSIHS, this
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proportion could certainly increase, providing the ACCHSs with both
greater resources and to some extent greater independence.
Having argued that the institutional need in Aboriginal health may be to
draw in and link organisational efforts and resources, rather than drive
them out in the name of reducing complexity, clarifying roles and
increasing coordination, we now wish to argue that one of the lessons of
past experience relates to the limits and dangers of focusing too heavily on
drawing in all relevant organisations and efforts in the name of
'intersectoral collaboration'. As used in the NAHSWP report, intersectoral
collaboration meant at least two quite different things. On the one hand, it
meant collaboration across various parts of the health services industry;
between the ACCHSs, hospitals, other community health providers and the
State, Territory and Commonwealth health departments. On the other hand,
it meant collaboration between health services and other service areas,
such as education, housing, and infrastructure. The rationale for this was
unimpeachable. It related to the argument that, as the NAHSWP put it,
Aboriginal health depends as much on "health systems infrastructure1 as it
does on health services provision (NAHSWP 1989: 59-84). However, as
the implementation of the NAHS during its first five years demonstrated,
the danger of this argument is that it may in fact dissipate reform effort and
resources directed to Aboriginal health. The ACCHSs lost faith in the
implementation of the NAHS partly because it ended up directing so many
of its resources to housing and infrastructure and not to health services.
What ought to have been an opportunity for reform in the health services
sector ended up, in large part, being captured by the housing and
infrastructure sector of ATSIC in the name of intersectoral collaboration.
Whatever its virtues, intersectoral collaboration should not give other
players in other sectors first call on Aboriginal health services resources
and reform efforts. Institutional reform in Aboriginalhealth must seek first
and foremost to enhance resources and efforts within the health sector.
Only secondarily should it seek to ensure that other sectors, such as
housing, infrastructure and education, are operating in ways which support
health efforts. Intersectoral collaboration, in this latter sense, needs to be
approached rather cautiously.
One further lesson to be drawn from past experience and elaborated as a
principle for future action relates to the avoidance of crisis-driven policy
cycles and the need to maintain momentum for reform beyond the
occasional easy consensus. The 1994 outbreak of concern and controversy
over Aboriginal health was not unique. It reflects something of a crisis
syndrome in much public policy making. When a crisis is occasionally
perceived in a particular subject area of social concern, a flurry of policy
activity often ensues and, in many instances, a consensus on the need for
policy action is arrived at. This consensus is, however, often rather easy
and somewhat misleading. The sense of crisis makes it unacceptable not to
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join the call to action. Yet in time, the sense of crisis is bound to dissipate
and a sense of complacency, or inattention to the subject area, is bound to
return (Hogwood 1987). As this occurs, consensus and the momentum for
reform may well disappear if not carefully managed. The question, then,
for Aboriginal health as for other policy areas, is how to maintain a
momentum for institutional and policy reform over time when the
occasional sense of crisis inevitably recedes.
One suggestion we would proffer is that reform efforts need, at least to
some extent, to be disarticulated from substantive changes in Aboriginal
health status. This may seem counter intuitive, in that the push for reform
is ostensibly driven by a concern for improving Aboriginal health status.
Yet changes in Aboriginal health status are unlikely to emerge in time
scales of one, two or even five years; the sorts of time scales in which
political processes and participants often seek results from institutional
reform. In these circumstances, using Aboriginal health status changes as
measures of the success, or otherwise, of institutional reform in Aboriginal
health can be very unhelpful. At best assessments of institutional reform
are likely to be neutral. At worst they are likely to be negative and lead to
premature abandonment of institutional reforms on the grounds that they
have not had demonstrable effects.
What the benchmarks should be for measuring the success, or otherwise, of
institutional reform in Aboriginal health, if Aboriginal health status per se
is not to be used, is no easy question. There are, we would argue however,
some processual measures which can be used to qualitatively assess the
success of reform efforts. One, for example, is whether all relevant
participants are being kept in the reform process and are expressing some
ownership of it. Another might be whether all participants are continuing
to acknowledge the important roles of others and feel that others are also
acknowledging their roles. These are, in a sense, measures of whether the
easy consensus of the crisis is being sustained and developed on a longer
term basis. They also relate to our argument about the need to draw in
organisations and their efforts to the Aboriginal health arena, rather than
drive them out. Another possible more substantive measure of success is
the types and amounts of resources which organisations are identifying as
being devoted to Aboriginal health issues. Although resources are not
themselves a measure of success, organisational capacity to identify them
does demonstrate some ongoing awareness and commitment. This in itself
is an important goal of institutional reform and could be taken considerably
further. The development of more critical debates about what might
constitute an 'equitable' allocation of resources to Aboriginal health, not
only through Aboriginal-specific programs but also through mainstream
programs such as Medicare, would be particularly helpful (Mooney
1996).15 So the task of assessing institutional reform, without requiring of it
22
unrealistic short term changes in substantive Aboriginal health status is not
impossible, although certainly it is quite difficult.
Current general developments
Since coming to power in March 1996, the Howard Coalition
Commonwealth government has begun to place its own mark on reform
processes in the health arena. In the 1996/97 budget, for example, it
introduced tax rebates claimable against private health insurance expenses
in an attempt to lessen demands on public ward hospital systems
(Wooldridge 1996: 2). The new government has also pushed along the
COAG reform process in health, suggesting in particular that health-related
specific purpose grants to the States and Territories be greatly reduced in
number and perhaps, in conjunction with the negotiation of new public
health agreements with the States and Territories, even transferred to an
'identified grants' stream within general purpose Commonwealth revenue
sharing (COAG 1996:3).
The relevance of the first of these developments, the tax rebates, to
Aboriginal health is probably marginal. Few Aboriginal people are likely
to be in a position to take out private health insurance. There is the slight
prospect, however, that a lessening of pressure on Commonwealth, State
and Territory health budgets may flow from an increase in private
insurance moneys coming into the health system and that this may in turn
open up some new room for manoeuvre within public sector health
funding. The potential for this should not, however, be overstated. The
relevance to Aboriginal health of the second development, the pushing
along of the COAG health processes, may however be more substantial
and is worthy of some further discussion.
Along with many involved at the service delivery level within the
community health system, the ACCHSs have long complained that
narrowly focused specific purpose programs are not well suited to their
broad, flexible primary health orientation. Such programs are seen as
restricting community health operations and priorities, and as requiring
inordinate administrative effort (see, for example, Bartlett and Legge
1994). Yet the Commonwealth specific purpose payments system has in
many ways encouraged the proliferation of such programs over the years.
As perceptions of new or changing health problems have emerged, the
Commonwealth response has often been to add a specific purpose payment
addressing the issue. In 1996 the Commonwealth Department of Finance's
catalogue of specific purpose payments identified no less than 23 in the
health area directed in some instances to matters as narrowly defined as
cervical cancer screening, artificial limbs and magnetic resonance imaging
(see Department of Finance 1996). While this may enable the
Commonwealth to promote very specific developments in health services,
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it must certainly also have its costs. The administrative processes of both
accessing and later acquitting funds from these narrowly focused programs
must inevitably be both tedious and onerous. Hence the idea of broader,
more general Commonwealth public health funding may well be as
attractive to the ACCHSs as to other community health service providers
and to the States and Territories. This may be particularly so if, as appears
to be emerging, there is some substantial cross-referencing between the
new Aboriginal health agreements in each State and Territory and the
proposed general public health agreements which would underlie such a
financing shift. Indeed such cross-referencing would be a useful way of
embedding the Aboriginal health agreements in broader health sector
funding processes, which at the moment they are not.
One other notable development under the Howard Coalition
Commonwealth government has been the maintenance of funding levels in
the Aboriginal-specific health programs of the OATSIHS in the 1996/97
budget. While funding maintenance may not sound much of an
achievement in an area of such acute need as Aboriginal health, in a
context of significant budgetary cuts in other areas, including in ATSIC, it
was indeed notable. The challenge, however, may arise from the Howard
government's declared intention to fund an additional 35 Aboriginal health
services from this only slightly increasing level of funding over the next
three years (Wooldridge 1996: 4). Such an addition will clearly only be
able to be sustained if OATSIHS helps its existing constituency of
ACCHSs, as well as some of the new ACCHCs, to find funds in the health
system beyond the limited Aboriginal-specific pool. OATSHIS's guidance
and assistance to the ACCHSs in this process may well prove a significant
test of their relationships. Trust in these relationships could potentially be
enhanced, but equally it could falter. Again much is still to be worked
through in this area of institutional reform.
Challenge and opportunity, responsibility sharing and self-
determination: a concluding comment
Linking Aboriginal health and institutional reform within Australian
federalism is clearly a major challenge for the whole Australian nation. In
part this challenge arises from the need to interweave in institutional
arrangements for Aboriginal health two rather disparate sets of ideas. One
of these sets of ideas is responsibility sharing within the Australian federal
system, while the other is Aboriginal self-determination.
Responsibility sharing is a crucial element of Australia'shighly concurrent
style of federalism. While the notion has great collaborative potential, it
also has the potential to fall far short of cooperative ideals amidst inter-
governmental and inter-organisational conflict. To a large extent the
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history of government involvement in Aboriginal health and the emergence
of the ACCHSs does involve such falling short. Responsibility has in the
past sometimes been avoided and disputed, rather than willingly taken up
and shared. But this has not always been the case. There have been more
positive developments and there can be more in the future. Responsibility
sharing can be made to work. Indeed, in the realpolitik of Australian
federalism, there is no other realistic way forward.
Self-determination has in the last 30 years become the philosophical
bedrock of Aboriginal organisation and action. It is a philosophy which
calls on governments to put aside the directive regulation which
characterised their involvement with Aboriginal people in the past and also
calls on Aboriginal people to take action in changing the conditions of their
own lives (Anderson 1994). Aboriginal self-determination in health, as in
other spheres, should not be read as an opportunity for governmental
disengagement. Aboriginal people's efforts need to be supported by
appropriate resources and expertise, which perhaps only governments can
provide. This support must, however, be provided in ways which respect
Aboriginal people and organisations as full partners in the process.
Aboriginal participation and priorities need to be seriously and conceitedly
addressed. This, it appears to us, is the crucial challenge in linking
Aboriginal health and institutional reform within Australian federalism,
linking Aboriginal self-determination with wide spread responsibility
sharing.
Though the extent of this challenge for Australian federalism should not be
underestimated, it should also be recognised that in the last two years a rare
opportunity for progress has emerged. This opportunity has arisen largely
as a result of the transfer of the Commonwealth's Aboriginal-specific
health funding program from ATSIC to CDHFS. This transfer has allowed
long standing tensions in the institutional arrangements of Aboriginal
health to be temporarily relieved, not only between these two
Commonwealth portfolios, but also between the ACCHSs and ATSIC and
the State and Territory health departments. Whether this lessening of
tension will persist and be converted into a greater sense of cooperative
responsibility sharing between these organisations over the longer term
only time will tell. The OATSIHS within the CDHFS has made a credible
start in its handling of relations within the arena both with the ACCHSs,
with ATSIC and with the State and Territory health departments. It can
only be hoped that these more cooperative relationships continue and that
the current opportunity for institutional reform in Aboriginal health within
Australian federalism is not let slip away. Such a development would
indeed be fitting as Australian federalism approaches its centenary.
25
Notes
1. From 1915 the Commonwealth did become involved in the direct provisions of
health services to war veterans. This, however, was for a long time done through
the Department of Repatriation, rather than the Department of Health, and
remained largely separate from Commonwealth involvement in health care for
the general population (see Lloyd and Rees 1994).
2. The inclusion of this last phrase in the Commonwealth's new head of
constitutional power was a major concession to the opposition of the medical
profession to plans like that of the Chifley government (see Sax 1984: 55).
3. This pattern of Commonwealth involvement, instigated by Labor, was partly
dismantled by the Fraser Coalition government from 1975 to 1983 (see Gray
1984; Sax 1984; Butler 1991). This dismantling, however, proved temporary.
4. Some recent figures are as follows. The Australian Institute of Health and
Welfare (1994: 122-5) calculated that in 1992-93 total recurrent health
expenditure in Australia was $34.3 billion, or 8.5% of Gross Domestic Product.
The Commonwealth accounted for $15.1 billion of this, the States, Territories
and local governments $8.1 billion and private expenditure $11.1 billion. Other
sources give a break down of a slightly lesser figure for Commonwealth
contributions as follows: $6 billion for medicare benefits, $2 billion for
pharmaceutical benefits (see Commonwealth Department of Human Services and
Health 1995) and $5.7 billion for health-related specific purpose grants to the
States and Territories (see Department of Finance 1996).
5. For comparison with other policy areas which have been given attention by
COAG (see Carroll and Painter 1995).
6. The other areas identified for grants were housing, education and employment
and vocational training (see Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of
Representatives, 11 September 1969: 1240-9).
7. The mood of the times among Aboriginal people is well captured in Gilbert
(1973). One of the defining moments of this new politics was the establishment
of the Aboriginal Embassy on the lawns of Parliament House in Canberra on 26
January 1972. Another lesser known manifestation was a divisive debate within
FCAATSI at its Easter 1970 conference over membership and voting rights
within the organisation. Previously the membership had been predominantly
sympathetic whites, but a move now emerged for restricting executive
membership and voting rights to people of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
descent (see Handler 1989; Burgmann 1993: 31-4).
8. For an account of the October 1990 Special Premiers Conference and events
leading up to it see Fletcher and Walsh 1991. Subsequent Special Premiers
Conferences pursuing this closer partnership became COAG from May 1992.
9. Richardson acknowledged, with his customary exaggeration, that 'a million
politicians have promised all that in the past 100 years', but argued that now it
had 'come time to do something'. Cartoonist, Geoff Pryor was less sanguine
about the difference between Richardson and previous politicians (The Canberra
Times 22 January 1994).
10. The Council had in fact been reviewed after only two meetings (see Codd 1993).
11. Another signal event of 1994 was that the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Social Justice Commissioner, Michael Dodson, devoted a large portion of his
report for the year to Indigenous Health. His argument was that the state of
Indigenous people's health in Australia was 'an abuse of human rights' and a
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'breach' of Australia's 'obligations at international law'. He also, however, argued
that there was 'comprehensive support within Australia' for improving
Indigenous health and that there was often 'bewilderment as to why nothing
appears to change'. His analysis of this lack of change related to different
'perspectives'; localised, holistic Indigenous perspectives versus centralised
fragmented bureaucratic perspectives. He argued for genuine, localised
community planning supported and resourced by government agencies. While
this analysis went 'well beyond arguing about which administrative arm of
government should be in charge of Indigenous health', Dodson did clearly see it
as unacceptable that Commonwealth funding of ACCHSs had been left to
ATSIC, with CDHSH making 'negligible contributions'. He argued that it was
'untenable' for Commonwealth departments to 'shift all responsibility' to ATSIC
for 'Aboriginal problems', believing that a 'combined strategy which utilises
existing ATSIC structures, existing community-level structures ... and existing
programmes of mainstream service providers could achieve the desired results'
(Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner 1995: 99-
175).
12. The Agreement being quoted here is the South Australian agreement. Though we
have not seen them, we are led to believe that the agreements applying to the
other States and Territories are very similar.
13. The South Australian Agreement does in fact formally establish an ongoing
quadripartite forum called the South Australian Aboriginal Health Partnership.
14. The proposed terms of reference for this Council are to advise the
Commonwealth on:
strategies for the Commonwealth to improve health outcomes for Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander peoples, including Indigenous specific and mainstream programs administered
by States and Territories, and the Commonwealth directly;
and ways to improve cross-sectoral linkages and coordination with environmental health
programs and other health programs.
14. The NAHS evaluation suggested that equity of resource allocation to Aboriginal
health should be thought of in terms of 'equal access to equal care appropriate to
need' (Gordon 1994: 2). More work needs to be done on these sorts of ideas.
Some more specific relevant work currently underway within the Health
Insurance Commission relates to geographic differences in the use made of
Medicare, particularly low usage of this health funding source in remote areas
with proportionately large Aboriginalpopulations.
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